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New Li2ht Throu2h Old Windows: A New Perspective On The 
British Economy In The Second World War 
In the Second World War the normal market orientation of the British economy 
was replaced by a system of centralised control and economic planning. The key 
feature of this system was the process of physical planning operated by the central 
authorities through which they controlled the allocation and use of scarce 
resources such as labour, steel and capacity. In the official history volumes (which 
dominate the historiography), however, one central question evades the reader -
how were these scarce resources allocated?' Page after page in volume after 
volume offers descriptive evidence of the decisions taken about resource 
allocation but far too often there is no analysis of how this was actually managed. 
The reader is allowed to drown in a sea of information, rarely being told what 
were the real and potential problems faced in resource allocation, what moves 
were taken to overcome the inherent frictions, and whether or not those moves 
were successful. 
I wish to contend that, given the institutional framework of the wartime 
administration, the central issue of the management of the British war economy 
was the potential and actual interdepartmental competition, its affect on resource 
allocation and the moves taken to counter it and promote cooperation. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the British wartime economy cannot be understood 
unless we know how resources were allocated and how the process of allocation 
evolved. 
The distinguishing feature of any economic system is how it chooses to allocate 
resources. In a market economy allocation is achieved through the operation of 
, The two most important volumes in this series are: W.K. Hancock and M.M. 
Gowing, British War Economy (London and Nendeln 1975) and M.M. Postan, 
British War Production (London and Nendeln 1975). 
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the price mechanism. In Britain in the Second World War, however, the 
Churchill Government abandoned any pretence of a laissez-faire attitude and 
evolved a system for the central direction of the war economy. An attempt was 
made to manage the economy without using prices as a guideline. The major 
allocative decisions were reached not through the interplay of market forces but 
through the invisible, and not so invisible, hands of government bureaucracies. 
Central government expenditure on defence, for example, increased from £254 
million in 1938/9 to £5,100 million in 1944/5 and this was matched by an expansion 
in the size of the non-industrial civil service staffs in the five war related 
government departments from 53,000 in 1939 to 241,000 in 1944.2 
Those government departments responsible for the armed forces and for supplying 
them with munitions came to dominate the economic system and they had priority 
with regards to scarce resources, such as steel and labour, within the economy. 
These resources were allocated by War Cabinet committees to which the 
departments made representations. All that stood between a department and the 
achievement of its desired allocation were the representations of other 
departments and thus the potential for departmental competition existed. 
The allocation of resources to a department depended on the relative priority 
given by the War Cabinet to their production programme and the relative strength 
of that department compared to other departments, including the ability of each 
of the service departments (those directly responsible for the army, navy and air 
force, respectively the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry) to 
influence overall military strategy. In order to ensure that it did not lose out in 
the competition for scarce resources, a department had either to present a highly 
persuasive case to the central allocator or it had to find ways of demonstrating 
2 Central Statistical Office, The Statistical Digest of the War (London and 
Nendeln 1975), 31 and 195; government expenditure is expressed in nominal 
values. 
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that the demands presented by other departments were weaker than its demands. 
Thus, resource allocation was the result of military necessity, productive 
possibilities and bureaucratic friction. In such a system the relationship between 
different departments and, more importantly, the relationship between each 
different department and the bodies responsible for resource allocation will 
become the focal point of the system - these relationships will define power, 
distribution and efficiency in the economy. 
In section I a simple game theoretic device will be used to show the potential 
problems faced by the central authorities; section 11 then sets out a formalised 
model of how the wartime British economy actually operated in terms of the 
process of physical planning; section III looks at how mechanisms that promoted 
cooperation evolved; the final section argues that there is still much to learn about 
the wartime economy and that the new approach suggested in this paper is a 
useful way of analyzing many of the important issues - that it is possible to bring 
new light through old windows. 
I 
In a centrally managed or administered economy in which most of the important 
resources are distributed by the central authorities the role of the price 
mechanism as an efficient carrier and conveyor of information becomes 
redundant. Instead, efficiency is crucially dependent upon the availability and 
processing of statistical, strategic and other technical information. Thus, the 
success of the system is decided by the flow and stock of non-price information 
(such as the alloy steel capacity of the country or the number of workers required 
to produce one heavy bomber). 
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In such a system, efficiency can only be ensured on two conditions: firstly, that all 
information is made available, at the minimum possible cost, to the apparatus that 
serves the central allocators; second, that the apparatus is an efficient information 
filtering service. The efficiency of the information filtering service will be defined 
by its ability to provide a comprehensive service, to coordinate its material and to 
render complex, quantitative issues meaningful through providing succinct reports 
to the decision-takers. These skills are important because if too little information 
is provided it is almost certain that a non-optimal decision will be made but, on 
the other hand, with too much information the path to the optimal outcome may 
become blurred in a thick fog of technical detail. If the bodies which decide on 
the nature of the different production and allocation programmes cannot evolve 
a cooperative strategy which ensures free and efficient information flows then it 
is likely that the system will be inefficient. 
In order to show the tensions that could exist in such a system, and in particular 
to show the potential for departmental conflict, it is necessary to start with some 
simplifying assumptions (these will be relaxed later). It will initially be assumed 
that the information filtering process is in fact efficient and that the more 
information that is available the more efficient will be the system. In a wartime 
economy it is possible to add two motivational assumptions to this: first, everyone 
in the system has a common interest in maximising the output of the economy and 
therefore in achieving the most efficient allocation of resources in relation to the 
strategic needs (that is, they desire to win the war); second, each supply 
department has a strong belief in the importance of its own particular work (that 
is, it believes that the war can only be won if it maximises its output within the set 
strategic considerationsV 
3 Here the path pioneered by W.A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government (Chicago and New York 1971), is followed in that it is implicitly 
assumed that the bureaucrat has a utility function which she attempts to maximise. 
This utility function is strongly linked to the size of the departmental budget and 
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We can now run through a simple abstract game to see what were the potential 
problems of such a system. Imagine that there are two departments (X and Y) 
competing for a particular resource. Each department has two options: it can 
reveal all the information it has available to the central allocator or it can choose 
to provide the central allocator with selective information (this would be designed 
to strengthen its case for the resource or, alternatively, not to weaken it). The 
dilemma faced by each department is illustrated in figure one which shows the 
four possible strategies that could be adopted. In a system in which only the first 
motivational assumption is applicable then the outcome would be a (both 
departments would reveal all the relevant information at their disposal to the 
central allocator), as there would be no reason to withhold information. This 
would be the best solution for the economy as a whole; a is the optimal outcome. 
However, if both assumptions hold then the outcome will not be optimal. It is 
unlikely to be b or c either because the department that is selective, assuming that 
its selection does indeed make its case more favourable, will, usually, be in a 
stronger position than the department that is not selective. Thus, the most likely 
outcome, indeed the only outcome in a system where both motivational 
hence the bureaucrat is no longer a neutral agent in the decision-making process. 
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assumptions hold and all departments are rational, is d. With outcome d it is 
indeterminate which department will be in a stronger position to receive the 
resources it wants because this will depend on how each selects and presents its 
material for the central allocator. What is apparent, though, is that for the 
economy as a whole d is the worst possible result because it provides the central 
allocator with the least amount of information. 
An explicit example of the fact that government departments in Britain in the 
Second World War were forced to follow selective information policies was given 
by Devons in his discussion of the Monthly Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production.4 The Bulletin was a comprehensive statistical work produced 
by the Ministry and originally circulated freely to all who wanted it. The Ministry 
soon discovered, however, that in interdepartmental disputes the Bulletin was a 
liability. By manipulating the statistics contained in it rival departments could 
demonstrate weaknesses in the Ministry's case as opposed to their case. Further, 
because the rival departments did not produce a similar document the Ministry 
could not retaliate in a like manner. A review of the role of the Bulletin resulted 
in a decision to curtail its internal circulation and to circulate only a censored 
version to outside agencies (that is, to select and circulate only that information 
deemed harmless by the department). There is also ample evidence of explicit 
departmental conflict in the wartime economy: for example, there were fierce 
disputes between various departments over the allocation of drop forgings in 1941; 
and, the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Admiralty had several 
confrontations over such things as the production of Hispano-Suiza and Oerlikon 
Guns in 1941 and the level of production of Barracuda aircraft in 1943.5 
4 E. Devons, Planning in Practice (Cambridge 1950), 152-4. 
5 Public Records Office, Kew (PRO)/BT28/l04, RM16(Part 11), meeting ofthe 
sub-committee on drop forgings, 1-3, 91uly 1941; PRO/CAB92/2, meeting of the 
Defence Committee (Operations), 27 March and 29 April; PRO/CAB92/54, 
meeting of the Production Executive, 4-5, 31 March 1941; PRO/CAB70/6, 
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The 'game' presented above did not reflect what actually occurred in the resource 
allocation process in wartime Britain - it is an abstract core model to which 
certain modifications can be made. Three points can be briefly mentioned. First, 
it should be realised that what has been presented up to now has been a static 
and passive procedure. In the wartime economy the allocation process was, 
however, both dynamic and interactive. The central allocator could, and did 
challenge the figures presented by the departments to support their case. Indeed, 
the ability of the central allocators (and their technical advisers) to transform a 
departmental programme into its necessary resource requirements with a good 
degree of accuracy improved over time. 
The effect of this can again be demonstrated by looking at the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production. In the early years of the war the Ministry operated the so-called 
'carrot' production programmes whereby they deliberately inflated the programme 
above what they thought could be achieved by as much as 15%.6 The central 
allocators noticed that the Ministry continually had difficulty meeting its targets 
and that therefore its resource demands seemed to be out of step with what was 
actually produced. Pressure from the central allocators was one of the reasons 
why, in 1943, the Ministry adopted the so-called Realistic Programme.7 This 
pressure also caused it to develop its own highly sophisticated statistical body to 
outflank the central statisticians. 
meetings of the Defence Committee (Supply), 7 January and 30 March 1943. 
6 Indeed, PRO/AlR20/1913, for example, contains several tables in which 
Ministry of Aircraft Production officials had calculated figures equal to 85 per 
cent of the official programme which were then used internally to judge 
production performance, even though externally they bid for resources on the 
basis of the full programme. 
7 See the correspondence between L1ewellin (then Minister of Aircraft 
Production) and Sinc1air (the Secretary of State for Air) in early October 1942 in 
PRO/A VIA9!9. 
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The second modification of the Departmental Dilemma game relates to the fact 
that it is not necessarily true that the goal of the central allocators was to achieve 
the most efficient outcome possible. Indeed, reading the minutes of the various 
War Cabinet committees it soon becomes obvious that the central allocators were 
more interested in arriving at the 'best possible compromise' situation. They 
realised that to achieve the most efficient outcome required an amount of time 
and a degree of statistical, production and strategic knowledge which was simply 
not available to them. 
Finally, the game as outlined above is based on rules of conflict, ignoring the role 
of cooperation. In practice, however, cooperation was especially important at 
what can be called the micro-level of relations between departments and 
committees. At this level officials were able to develop informal contacts which 
facilitated a freer movement of information. Thus, even where departmental 
heads were in conflict, information flows occurred at the micro-level and so 
enabled the system to achieve outcomes that were more efficient than it would 
otherwise have been possible to achieve. 
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To examine the operation of the economy in this period, to evaluate the process 
of allocating scarce resources, it is therefore necessary to understand the 
organisation of the central bureaucracy and in particular to understand the 
interaction and relationship between different departments and between 
departments and the central allocating bodies. Figure two shows the 
organisational structure ofthe British wartime economy, from May 1940, focusing 
on the information flows which were important to the central decision-making 
process as it affected resource allocation and war production. 
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Figure two is, of necessity, an abstraction; in particular, it is a static representation 
and does not attempt to capture all the organisational changes that occurred 
during the war. It does, however, capture the essence of how the system operated 
during most of the period. In addition to showing the main bodies, it also 
indicates some of their more important members. The links shown in figure two 
are not exhaustive - they merely represent the main channel of decision-making 
with regards to war production. In reality there were links between most of the 
different components shown, in particular there were strong links between the 
service departments and their sister supply departments (the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production, the Ministry of Supply and the production arm of the Admiralty). 
The decision-making process was split into two spheres: the Production Sphere 
and the Strategic Sphere (I am primarily interested in the munitions programmes 
and have therefore ignored the civilian economy; however, it would be fairly easy 
to take this sector into account by simply adding a third, civilian, sphere). In the 
Strategic Sphere the military decisions which affected production were taken; in 
the Production Sphere, the production programmes were formulated and 
implemented so as to meet the military needs. There were three stages to the 
decision-making process: first, the strategic priorities were decided upon; these 
were then converted into Control Figures (representing the munitions 
programmes); finally, the Correction Principle modified the Control Figures in the 
light of events not apparent when they were set.s 
8 For a fuller discussion of some of the theoretical issues raised by this 
approach see W.P. Howlett, 'Towards a Model of the Central Decision-Making 
Process in a War Economy', Discussion Paper in Economics, 89/7 (July 1989), 
Department of Economics, University of Stirling. This draws on J. Kornai, Anti-
equilibrium, (Amsterdam, 1971) and D. Granick, 'An Organisational Model of 
Soviet Industrial Planning', Journal of Political Economy, 67 (1959), 109-32. 
9 
Fi~ure 2. An or~anisational model of the British economy 
in the Second World War 
WAR CABlNEf (1, 2, 3,4,6, 7, 11) 
, t 
DEFENCE COMMITIEE DEFENCE COMMITIEE 
(SUPPLY) (OPERATIONS) 
(1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12) (2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12) 
, t 
PRODUCTION COMMITIEE CHIEFS-OF-ST AFF 
COMMITIEE 
(3,8,9) (5, 11) 
, t 
SUPPLY DEPARTMENTS and SERVICE 
the DEPARTMENTS 
MINISTRY OF LABOUR 
, t 
INDIVIDUAL FIRMS THEATRES OF WAR 
I PRODUCTION SPHERE I I STRATEGIC SPHERE I 
1. Anderson 7. Minister of Production 
2. Attlee 
3. Bevin 
4. Churchill 
5. Chiefs-of-Staff 
6. Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 
8. President of the Board of Trade 
9. Supply ministers 
10. Service ministers 
11. Bridges 
12. Ismay 
Service departments are the Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the War Office. 
Supply departments are the Admiralty, the Ministry of Aircraft Production and 
the Ministry of Supply. 
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Information from the theatres of war was gathered by each of the service 
departments and was used by them to develop their medium term strategic plan 
(in terms of the munitions they would require). Each department then presented 
its case at a meeting of the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee.9 This body met daily 
during the war to discuss the military situation but it rarely debated anything in 
depth - its purpose was to accept (and therefore refer to a higher authority), 
reject or return for consideration reports submitted to it by the Joint Planning 
bodies or individual Chiefs-of-Staff. lo The Committee referred any questions it 
had to the Joint Planning Staff. This was composed of the equivalent of a 
Director of Plans seconded from each of the three armed forces. In turn, the Staff 
would nominate an ad hoc Inter-Service Planning Staff, with appropriate outside 
help, to tackle a particular problem and report back to the Chiefs-of- Staff 
Committee. In this way the decisions of the armed forces and the information at 
their disposal could be channelled up to the highest levels. The decisions taken 
by the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee were passed to the Defence Committee 
(Operations). It ran a final eye over the plans before they were presented to the 
War Cabinet.1I The main function of the Defence Committee (Operations) 
would seem to have been to try and settle any outstanding differences of opinion 
between the armed forces which the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee had been unable 
9 See PRO/CAB79/5-32. 
10 PRO/PREM3, 119,6, correspondence between Ismay and Churchill, March 
1942. 
11 See PRO/CAB69/1-7. 
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to resolve . . 
Since officially the only pennanent member of the Defence Committee 
(Operations) was Churchill, it can be seen that he played a vital role in setting the 
strategic objectives, or what I tenn the Priorities. He exerted pressure on the 
principal departments and Cabinet committees through the Prime Minister's 
Personal Minutes. These could cover anything and everything. After the 
relatively listless Chamberlain administration these minutes injected a sense of 
urgency into the system and they 'did much to confinn the feeling that there was 
now a strong personal control at the centre' to which the Whitehall machinery 
responded immediately and radically.ll However, there was criticism that 
sometimes Churchill interfered in what were primarily departmental affairs and 
this caused particular irritation if it was felt that the hand of his personal adviser 
Cherwell was behind the minutes.13 
The War Cabinet was responsible for the overall direction of the state. Its 
members represented the senior ministries of the Crown and as such they 
reflected the political balance of the Coalition Government. The supply and 
11 J. Wheeler-Bennett (ed.), Action This Day (London 1968), 20-22,50-1, 150. 
13 According to one senior minister, Anderson was 'very concerned' about the 
way Churchill interfered with 'everybody's department ... without any regard to the 
history of the problem [and suggested solutions without] intimate knowledge of 
the difficulties ... below the surface' (S.M.M. Lawlor, 'British Politics and Strategy, 
May 1940-March 1941', Ph.D. dissertation, Ph.D. 11640, University of Cambridge 
(1984), 179). 
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service ministers were excluded except in the case of Beaverbrook, whose place 
in the War Cabinet was not due to his ministerial brief but to his role as trusted 
adviser to Churchill. In most cases the War Cabinet merely rubber-stamped the 
decisions passed on to it by the coordinating committees. Thus, normally the 
Cabinet would receive the Priorities from the Defence Committee (Operations), 
note them and then pass them onto the Production Sphere. However, if there 
was any serious interdepartmental dispute, especially in the Production Sphere, 
which the coordinating bodies could not settle, the War Cabinet would act as the 
final arbitrator - as it had done in the First World War.\4 
As in the Strategic Sphere there were two levels of coordinating bodies in the 
Production Sphere - the Defence Committee (Supply) and the Production 
Committee. The main functions of the Defence Committee (Supply), like its 
strategic counter-part, appeared to have been to act as a buffer between its junior 
coordinating body and the War Cabinet, to run a check over the final production 
programmes presented to it by the Production Committee, and to sort out those 
disputes between the supply departments which the Committee was unable to 
resolve.15 Scott and Hughes aptly summed up the function of the Defence 
Committee (Supply) thus: '[it] dealt with ends rather than means, with figures 
14 l.A. Fairlie, British War Administration (New York 1919), 51; l. Turner, 
'Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats: the Higher Direction of the War', in K 
Burk (ed.), The War and the State (London 1982). 
IS See PRO/CAB70/l-7. 
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rather than words, with decisions rather than discussion... [and was] the 
fountainhead of authority in production matters'.16 
The means, words and discussions which the Defence Committee (Supply) did 
without were to be found in the Production Committee, whose main function was 
to try and coordinate the production programmes of the supply departments. The 
Production Committee used the Priorities (handed down from the War Cabinet) 
and information on the production possibilities to transform the strategic demands 
into tentative output and input requirements -the Control Figures. The Control 
Figures were then used by the central allocating bodies (which were normally sub-
committees of the Production Committee, such as the Materials Committee and 
the Industrial Capacity Committee) to allocate resources between the various 
departments. The allocating committees were again staffed by members of the 
supply departments (and other interested agents) and as such they were non-
neutral bodies - they were the focus of the Departmental Dilemma game. The 
Control Figures, in the form of production programmes and resource allocations, 
were handed down from the Production Committee to the supply departments 
who, in turn, placed orders with individual firms. 
In terms of resource allocation, the principal body in the wartime economy was 
the Production Committee but there was no body with that title in the War 
16 16 J.D. Scott and R. Hughes, The Administration of War Production 
(London 1955),410. 
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Cabinet organisation; this title has been used to encompass a series of bodies 
which broadly fulfilled the functions described above. The first body to fulfil the 
role of the Production Committee was the Ministerial Committee On Economic 
Policy. This was a Chamberlainite organ and was more concerned with financial 
economic problems (such as the balance of payments, prices, wages and taxation) 
than the physical economic problems (such as the availability and allocation of 
steel and labour) that were to determine the nature of the British war 
economy. 17 This concern was reflected by the fact that the Chairman of the 
Committee was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The decline of financial 
planning and the rise of physical planning was signalled by the creation, by 
Churchill, of the Production Council in May 1940, which effectively succeeded the 
Ministerial Committee on Economic Policy. This change in emphasis was 
reflected by the fact that the Chairman of the new body was the Minister Without 
Portfolio (Arthur Greenwood) and that its principal members were the Minister 
of Labour (Ernest Bevin), the supply ministers and, representing the civilian 
interests, the President of the Board of Trade. The Treasury was nowhere to be 
seen. 
The Production Council experienced some teething problems and was replaced 
by the Production Executive in January 1941 and this latter body was itself 
abolished with the creation of the new Ministry of Production in 1942. One ofthe 
17 See PRO/CAB7211-5. 
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main reasons for the creation of the new ministerial post was the need to have a 
War Cabinet minister who had the authority to speak for all the supply and 
service departments in negotiations with the Americans.18 Within the Ministry 
of Production the successor to the Production Executive was, in many ways, the 
Joint War Production Planning Group and the Programme and Planning Division. 
The purpose of the Staff was: 'to see that sufficient weapons of the right kind 
were available at the right time .... (and) to provide a link between strategy and 
production'; to ensure that all programmes were realistic and to adjust them as 
necessary in the light of strategic considerations and production possibilities; and, 
to coordinate the combined requirements of the three services in relation to each 
other.19 This new body went even further than the Production Executive as it 
was explicitly charged with trying to bridge the gap between the Strategic and 
Production Spheres, although the onus was still on trying to match production to 
strategy and not vice versa.20 
If the War Cabinet and its committees were the engine of the wartime economy 
then the War Cabinet Office was its oil. The War Cabinet Office supplied the 
permanent civil servants to the War Cabinet and its committees. It reflected the 
organisational structure described above in that it was divided into a military (or 
18 Scott and Hughes, op. cit., 432-55. 
19 PRO/CAB92139, JWPS(42)1, 30 March 1942. 
20 See PRO/CAB92139-40. 
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strategic) half and a civil (or production) half. The Permanent Secretary was Sir 
Edward Bridges and he was supported by a Deputy Secretary (Military) and a 
Deputy Secretary (Civil). They sat on all the senior directing bodies of the war 
economy and their subordinates sat on all other central committees. This meant 
that they were able to collate and coordinate information from the Production 
Sphere and the Strategic Sphere. The cooperation between the two halves of the 
War Cabinet Office was of fundamental importance in achieving a coherent policy 
between the various Cabinet committees they served. It gave a vertical and 
horizontal unity to the committees and to the departments and so ensured that 
the policies pursued were consistent across committees and across the Spheres. 
Without such a well structured and professional central secretariat the wartime 
economy would undoubtedly have been a more ad hoc and chaotic affair. 
The final stage in the decision making process was what could be termed the 
Correction Principle. This represented the bargaining process which followed the 
issuing of the Control Figures to firms. Up to now we have described a basically 
static model in that all decisions have taken place in a single period where 
everything remains constant as the process works itself out. In reality, the process 
was a dynamic one and the administrative and production constraints facing the 
decision-makers were constantly changing. Thus, the original information on 
which the Priorities and the Control Figures were based might have become 
redundant by the time the final allocations were made - the strategic situation may 
17 
have altered or new administrative or production bottlenecks may have occurred. 
The Correction Principle explicitly recognised the existence of such possibilities 
and allowed for a new round of bargaining to occur between firms and 
departments and between the departments and the Production Committee, to 
make adjustments to the programmes and the allocations. Typically such 
adjustments were marginal in nature. 
One of the most important features of the war economy was the primary role of 
strategy. The flow of the decision-making process in figure two is shown to be 
from the theatres of war, through the Strategic Sphere to the War Cabinet and 
then down through the Production Sphere to the firms. This is merely stating the 
obvious - in times of war the essential thing is to win on the battlefield. Thus, the 
main determinant of the Control Figures is the strategic priorities: if strategic 
considerations demand that light tanks, bomber aircraft, and escort ships must be 
available to fight the enemy successfully then that is what the munitions industries 
must produce. The superiority of strategy over production could be seen by the 
fact that the decisions taken in the Strategic Sphere were self-contained in a way 
which those in the Production Sphere were not. The supply ministers were not 
represented on the coordinating committees in the Strategic Sphere (they could 
say nothing to influence strategic policy because they lacked the relevant 
information); the service ministers, on the other hand, were represented on the 
coordinating committees in the Production Sphere (they influenced production 
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policy because it was geared, primarily, to meeting their requirements). Although 
the Production Sphere could affect strategy (for example, by failing to deliver a 
particular weapon at a particular time) it did not do so as an ex ante constraint. 
III 
The important role of information and knowledge can be gauged by the fact that 
relatively sophisticated information flows and information filtering systems were 
developed during the war. This can be illustrated by looking at the case of steel 
allocation. Most of the initial donkey work was done by the Iron and Steel 
Control. It collected information on the potential steel supply for the coming 
quarter and the steel requirements of the departments. 21 The control was one 
of several material Controls run by the Raw Materials Department and it passed 
the information it had gathered to its superior. The Raw Materials Department 
then checked this information for balance and consistency before passing it on to 
the Materials Committee which was responsible for allocation. The Materials 
Committee was a sub-committee of the Production Committee and was composed 
of all the departments with an interest in the allocation of materials. In terms of 
steel allocation it was the most important body in the war economy - a fact that 
is not emphasised in the official histories. The Materials Committee used the 
detailed information at its disposal and the Control Figures as issued by the 
Production Committee to make the steel allocations for the coming quarter and 
21 See PRO/POWE5/114; PRO/POWE5n9-81. 
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to sort out any departmental disputes. The Committee passed its 
recommendations (with a small information base) on to the Production 
Committee. Unless there had been an important development (or a serious 
interdepartmental dispute which the Materials Committee had been unable to 
settle), the Production Committee would simply ratify the recommendations of the 
Materials Committee. The allocations were then passed on to the War Cabinet, 
via the Defence Committee (Supply), for final approval (at each stage passing 
through another information filter). 
At the top of the hierarchy, the authorities realised it was important that the 
many and varied information flows that occurred in the economy were 
coordinated properly and that there was independent advice available. Thus, they 
developed their own statistical and economic bodies and advisers; the most 
important of these were the Central Statistical Office, the Economic Section and 
the Prime Minister's Statistical Section, all of which utilised the abilities of 
academic economists and statisticians drafted into the system as temporary civil 
servants. 
The Central Statistical Office and the Economic Section were vital parts of the 
Cabinet infrastructure. Given the importance of statistical information in the 
wartime economy it was vital that the War Cabinet could call on a neutral body 
to collect, collate and produce statistics. The Central Statistical Office was such 
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a body: it was not allowed to make any comments on the statistics it produced 
other than technical comments.22 When there was a serious interdepartmental 
dispute its duty to provide "neutral" data which would allow the dispute to be 
settled. 
Neutral economic advice was provided by the Economic Section which was staffed 
by some excellent academic economists, including John Jewkes, Lionel Robbins, 
Austin Robinson, James Meade, Alec Cairncross and Evan Durbin. The Section 
effectively acted as advisers to Sir John Anderson who was the de facto 'Prime 
Minister for the Economy' (Churchill being more interested in strategic matters). 
Their contribution made permanent civil servants (and ministers) realise that 
members of the ivory towers could play an important role in the economy, and 
their technical expertise was another foundation stone in the successful wartime 
organisation.2J 
The Prime Minister's Statistical Section was a non-governmental body of 
specialists, headed by Professor Lindemann (who became Lord Cherwell in 1941), 
whose duty was to provide Churchill with independent criticisms and judgements 
22 Nuffield College Library, Oxford, Lord Cherwell's Papers (NC/LC), F86, 
'English Statistical Experience Since the Outbreak of War', 14 July 1941. 
2J J.E. Meade, 'Obituary for Lionel Robbins', Economica , 52 (1985), 4; W.S. 
Churchill, The Second World War, Voltlme Ill: the GrandAlliance (London 1950), 
76; Lord Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London 1962), 34; A. 
Cairncross and N. Watts, TIle Economic Section 1939-1961 (London and New 
York 1989). 
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over a wide range of questions. They did this by constructing graphs, which were 
then bound into albums for easy inspection, to keep Churchill informed of the 
progress of events, and by offering advice on any proposals submitted to him. An 
important aspect of their work was the scrutiny of the requirements presented to 
the cental allocation bodies by the departments bidding for resources. It was their 
duty 'to winnow through the various figures in order to find instances where the 
requirement could be reduced to absurdity,.24 
This strong advocate role naturally aroused hostility in the departments being 
scrutinised as it was yet another layer of information filtering which many felt was 
unnecessary. Many civil servants, including some of those economists who worked 
as temporary civil servants, felt that although the Section could be constructive it 
was often destructive, causing them to run around for days examining ideas put 
into Churchill's head by the Section that they, the civil servants, knew from the 
beginning were not implementable.25 
The Section probably also contributed to inefficiency in the central administration 
by duplicating work done by other bodies, particularly the Central Statistical 
Office. The two bodies had a close relationship and were in constant contact. In 
some ways this was inevitable as they were both concerned with similar areas, 
24 R.F. Harrod, The Pro! (London 1959), 201. 
25 I am indebted to conversations with Professor Sir Austin Robinson for these 
observations. 
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although, unlike the Central Statistical Office, the Prime Minister's Statistical 
Section involved itself with data of an operational nature.26 It was also necessary 
in order to prevent too much overlap in their work. However, although the 
Central Statistical Office was primarily concerned with routine day-to-day 
statistical work and the Prime Minister's Statistical Section with more specific, 
specialised problems, there was undoubtedly much duplication of effort and 
work.Z7 
The existence of information filtering systems such as existed for steel allocation 
and advisory bodies such as the Central Statistical Office, the Economic Section 
and the Prime Minister's Statistical Section ensured a freer and fuller flow of 
information occurred. In terms of the Departmental Dilemma game these bodies 
ensured that even if both departments wanted to follow se1ctive strategies the 
system as a whole would not end up in position d (with the least possible 
information released) since the departments would be harried by, for example, the 
Prime Minister's Statistical Section to release more information in order to justify 
their demands. Two other features of the wartime economy helped to reduce 
departmental conflict and to create an atmosphere of cooperation: the flexibility 
of the organisational structure and the development of informal contacts between 
26 NC/LC/F86, op. cit.. 
21 For more information on the Prime Minister's Statistical Section see the 
account given by G.D.A. MacDougall, 'The Prime Minister's Statistical Section', 
in D.N. Chester, Lessons o/the British War Economy (London 1951),58-68; and 
that given in Harrod, op. cit., 187-207. 
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departments and between departments and the central allocators (in terms of 
figure one these features were encouraging a move towards postion a). 
From figure two it can be seen that the organisational structure of the decision-
making process was clearly defined, with a strict hierarchial nature. This was 
important because it meant that a decision taken at any level of the system could 
be communicated to all other levels quickly and effectively. In most cases there 
was also no dispute about the relative authority of any committee or other body 
in the system - where there were disputes they were normally settled quickly and 
the relationship between the disputers defined so as to avoid further conflict 
(although this is not to argue that administrative bottlenecks did not occur). 
However, flexibility was also built into the system by using ad hoc committees to 
deal with situations which the formal structure found difficult to accommodate. 
The best example of the importance of these informal mechanisms was a series 
of meetings (chaired by Anderson) on the manpower problem in 1942. 
The demarcation lines with respect to labour questions were far from clear, in 
particular the Ministry Of Labour and the Ministry Of Production were disputing 
control over several areas. Such demarcation disputes were potentially wasteful 
of resources and the administrative friction they generated often led to duplication 
and hence inefficiency (in this case, it resulted in a situation where, at one point 
in 1942, three different bodies were working on almost identical assessments of 
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fu ture labour supply and allocation and using almost exactly the same data). The 
pivotal body in resolving the disputes and rescuing the labour budgets from 
organisational chaos was a series of ad hoc meetings under the chairmanship of 
Anderson, collectively known as the Lord President's Manpower Meetings.28 This 
ad hoc committee existed outside the formal organisational structure and it 
represented the most important labour committee in the crucial period of the 
Manpower Budgets, but in the official history volumes it is only alluded to in 
passing. The Lord President's Manpower Meetings brought together the heads of 
the Production Sphere and the Strategic Sphere and were advised by the most 
prominent non-executive officials in the economy. The breadth and depth of the 
membership of this unparalleled series of meetings allowed Anderson to present 
a coordinated view of the manpower situation across the economy and to develop 
a coherent manpower policy. 
The development of informal contacts between officials was also crucial in 
overcoming the inevitable administrative friction of a wartime organisation by 
ensuring a freer flow of information. Devons, in talking of the relationship 
between the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft Production, emphasised the 
importance of informal contacts over time: 
'Each department was unwilling to admit officials of the other to its 
secrets. Each feared that information so obtained might be used 
28 See PRO/LAB79/21-3. 
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against it in interdepartmental argument, and wished to guard 
against premature action being taken by the other on schemes which 
were still under debate; however, as officials got to know each other 
the flow of information gathered pace, albeit unofficially.029 
In other words, as time passed the unofficial links grew in strength; even though 
there were occasional squabbles at the Ministerial level, at lower levels the 
relations of the two departments improved progressively. 
IV 
There are two reasons why the conclusions of the official historians with regards 
to wartime resource allocation by Whitehall should be re-examined: firstly, there 
is the obvious fact that most of the volumes are now thirty or more years old; a 
stronger reason is that their analysis of the inherent economic relationships that 
underlay the process of wartime resource allocation tend to be rooted in 
anecdotal stories rather than in an objective framework. Given that the economic 
analysis of bureaucracy and central economic management has evolved much in 
the last two decades it is now possible to make the analysis of those underlying 
29 E. Devons, Papers on Pwnning and Economic Management (Manchester 
1970),54. 
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economic relationships more explicit (as was attempted above with the 
Departmental Dilemma game) and to try and perceive the patterns that emerged 
and how the system evolved. By making the organisational structure more explicit 
many of the tensions and problems that existed in the system become clear, 
including: the role of military strategy in relation to production; the tendency 
towards departmental conflict and administrative friction; the central role of 
information flows; the need for flexibility within the formal central economic 
structure; and, the importance of the encouragement and development of informal 
links between officials in the system. 
The system was never as rigid as figure two would suggest but in principle the 
central economic organisation changed surprisingly little during the war. Lessons 
had been learnt from the chaotic experiences of the First World War and in the 
decade prior to 1939 provisional plans had been drawn up which were then put 
into operation when war broke out.30 During the period of the Phoney War, 
however, the situation in Whitehall still had strong overtones of 'business as 
usual', as the Treasury chairmanship of the Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Policy demonstrated, and it took the German offensive in 1940 and the incoming 
Churchill administration to replace financial with physical planning. 
Postan describes the Churchill years not in terms of a triumphal progress but as 
30 For a discussion of the inter-war preparations see Hancock and Gowing, op. 
cit., 45-72. 
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a process of an economy learning to walk, often unsteadily and sometimes 
stumbling, on the new centrally managed terrain;31 and this was also reflected, 
or more probably was a reflection of, the evolution of the process of resource 
allocation itself. In 1940 and 1941 the learning experience was at its height and 
the problems of a centrally administered system that were outlined above were at 
their most virulent, the Ministry of Aircraft Production under Beaverbrook (May 
1940 to May 1941) in particular ran amok, but gradually the growing knowledge 
of the central allocators and advisory bodies such as the Central Statistical Office 
and the Economic Section, the greater sophistication of information gathering and 
information filtering, and the growing understanding between officials engendered 
a spirit of cooperation that was the foundation of the successful running of the 
wartime economy. 
31 Postan, op. cit.. 
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